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PROPORTIONALITY: AN ADDITION TO 
THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE 
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES’ 
FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 
STANDARD 
ANNE MARIE MARTIN* 
Abstract: The fair and equitable treatment standard, established in state law, 
customary law, and bilateral investment treaties, requires that states treat inves-
tors in a consistent and transparent manner. With its decision in Occidental Pe-
troleum Corp., Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of 
Ecuador, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) interpreted the ever-expanding fair and equitable treatment standard to 
include the principle of proportionality. After concluding that Ecuador’s termi-
nation of the investor’s contract was a disproportionate response to the inves-
tor’s breach of that contract, the ICSID Tribunal awarded an incredible $1.77 
billion in damages. The potential for crushing liability for host countries and the 
overprotection of investors has resulted in the recent withdrawal of a number of 
host countries from the ICSID and from Bilateral Investment Treaties. This re-
treat will continue until the Tribunal recalibrates the fair and equitable treatment 
standard to provide balanced protection for both the investor and the host coun-
try. 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 5, 2012, the International Centre for the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (ICSID) awarded damages of $1.77 billion after finding 
that the Republic of Ecuador had breached Ecuadorian law, international law, 
and the Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ec-
uador Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ment (the Bilateral Investment Treaty or BIT).1 The ICSID Tribunal found 
that Ecuador had violated the fair and equitable treatment standard because 
Ecuador’s termination of its Participation Contract with the Occidental Ex-
ploration and Production Company (OEPC) was not a proportional response 
                                                                                                                           
 *Anne Marie Martin is the Executive Note Editor for Volume 38 of the Boston College Inter-
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 1 Occidental Petroleum Corp., Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award ¶ 876 (Oct. 5, 2012). 
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to OEPC’s breach of the contract.2 At the time, OEPC was Ecuador’s largest 
oil investor, extracting around 100,000 barrels of oil per day.3 Today, state-run 
Petroamazonas controls operations.4 Both the size of the award and the solidi-
fication of proportionality as a principle underlying the fair and equitable 
treatment standard have led some to describe the ruling as “the most im-
portant jurisprudential development of the year.”5 
This Comment considers proportionality in the context of the expanding 
definition of fair and equitable treatment and the appropriateness of the size 
of the award. Part I presents background information about the OEPC’s in-
vestment in Block 15 in Ecuador and the Caducidad Decree, which terminat-
ed the contract between the parties. Part II explores the fair and equitable 
treatment standard in international investment law, particularly the principle 
of proportionality. Part II also discusses the Tribunal’s findings and its calcu-
lation of damages. Part III argues that the Tribunal overly expanded the fair 
and equitable treatment standard to provide further protection to investors and 
calls for additional protections for host countries. Part III also argues that the 
size of the award is likely to deter developing countries from voluntarily 
submitting to the ICSID. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Block 15 is an area of 200,000 hectares located in the most oil-rich re-
gion of Ecuador, deep in the Ecuadorian Amazon rainforest.6 OEPC and Ec-
uador entered into the Participation Contract on May 21, 1999, which gave 
OEPC the obligation to develop and to exploit certain fields until 2012 and 
other fields until 2019 in exchange for a 70 percent share of the oil produced 
from Block 15.7 In 2000, OEPC and Alberta Energy Company (AEC) signed 
the Farmout Agreement, in which AEC agreed to contribute to OEPC’s Block 
15 investments in exchange for the right to 40 percent of OEPC’s share of 
Block 15’s production.8 Senior executives from OEPC and AEC met with the 
Ecuadorian Minister of Energy and Mines to inform him about the Farmout 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See id. ¶ 452. 
 3 Press Release, MidnightTrader Live Briefs, Energy Stocks Trimming Losses Late; Occi-
dental Wins $1.77-Billion Arbitration Award, (Oct. 8, 2012) available at http://go.galegroup.com.
proxy.bc.edu/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA304701373&v=2.1&u=mlin_m_bostcoll&it=r&p=ITOF&s
w=w. 
 4 See id. 
 5 See Global Dispute of the Year, Investment Arbitration: Occidental v. Ecuador, AMERICAN 
LAWYER (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202616473638&
Global_Dispute_of_the_Year_Investment_Arbitration_Occidental_v_Ecuador (last visited Oct. 17, 
2014). 
 6 Award, Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11 ¶ 109. 
 7 Id. ¶¶ 115, 116, 117. 
 8 Id. ¶¶ 129, 130. 
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Agreement, but there is a dispute as to what occurred during that meeting, 
and the Ministry never granted official authorization.9 
Years later, however, on August 24, 2004, the Attorney General of Ecua-
dor wrote to the Minister of Energy and Mines requesting that he terminate 
the Participation Contract due to the transfer of interests and obligations to 
AEC, which OEPC did without ministerial authorization. 10  In September 
2004, PetroEcuador, Ecuador’s national oil company, initiated the termination 
procedure by notifying OEPC of its alleged non-compliance with the Partici-
pation Contract; OEPC denied the allegation.11 
In early 2005, anti-United States and anti-foreign investment demonstra-
tors assembled in front of OEPC offices in Quito to protest the government’s 
failure to terminate OEPC’s contract.12 During the spring of 2005, OEPC had 
meetings with PetroEcuador to negotiate a solution.13 In April 2005, days of 
violent protests broke out in Quito, and the Ecuadorian Congress ousted Pres-
ident Lucio Gutiérrez.14 Additionally, the Minister of Energy and Mines and 
the Executive President of PetroEcuador resigned.15 
In November 2005, Minister Iván Rodríguez, the new Minister of Ener-
gy and Mines, notified OEPC of cause for termination of the Participation 
Contract.16 Protests continued, with a demonstration outside OEPC’s offices 
in May 2006 in which then-candidate for President, Dr. Rafael Correa, called 
for a symbolic “closure forever” of OEPC.17 On May 15, 2006, Minister 
Rodríguez issued the Caducidad Decree, which immediately terminated the 
Participation Contract and required that OEPC transfer all assets related to 
Block 15 to PetroEcuador.18 In May 2006, State officials seized all of OEPC’s 
oil fields in Block 15 as well as all property in its offices.19 
Subsequently, OEPC requested arbitration in front of an ICSID Tribu-
nal.20 An affiliate of the World Bank Group, the ICSID provides arbitral ser-
vices for investment disputes to those states that have ratified the ICSID Con-
vention.21 Investment arbitration has grown robustly over the past decade.22 
                                                                                                                           
 9 Id. ¶¶ 147, 149, 381. 
 10 Id. ¶¶ 177–178. 
 11 Id. ¶ 180. 
 12 Id. ¶ 181. 
 13 Id. ¶ 185. 
 14 Id. ¶ 186. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. ¶ 192. 
 17 Id. ¶¶ 196, 198. 
 18 Id. ¶ 199. 
 19 Id. ¶ 200. 
 20 See id. ¶ 1. 
 21 See SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43052, 
U.S. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 7 (2013). 
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According to a report by the United Nations, in 2012, nine decisions awarded 
damages and parties filed a record sixty-two new cases.23 
In the arbitration, the ICSID Tribunal found that the assignment to AEC 
without Ministry authorization was in breach of the Participation Contract.24 
But the Tribunal also decided that the Caducidad Decree was not a propor-
tionate response to OEPC’s breach of contract, and therefore the government 
issued the Decree in breach of Ecuadorian law, customary international law, 
and Article II.3(a) of the BIC.25 Consequently, the Tribunal awarded OEPC 
$1,769,625,000 in damages. 26 The $1.77 billion award to OEPC was the 
highest in the history of Investor-State Dispute Settlement.27 One of the three 
members of the Tribunal, Brigitte Stern, dissented as to the calculation of 
damages.28 
Five days after the award, Ecuador filed an appeal of the $1.77 billion 
judgment, arguing that the ICSID lacked jurisdiction over the case.29 Ecuador 
has requested annulment of the award, claiming that this arbitration award 
and another lawsuit by Chevron could send Ecuador into bankruptcy.30 The 
annulment request is still pending before the Tribunal.31 
Additionally, while the proceedings were underway, Ecuador sent the 
World Bank notice of its denunciation of the ICSID Convention.32 The with-
drawal took effect on January 7, 2010, after the commencement of the pro-
ceedings but before the final award.33 Since 2008, Ecuador has also cancelled 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L. J. 775, 838–
39 (2012). 
 23 See Press Release, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, International 
Investment Disputes Hit Record in 2012—U.N. Report, U.N. News Centre (Apr. 10, 2013). 
 24 See Award, Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11 ¶ 381. 
 25 See id. ¶ 452. 
 26 Id. ¶ 876. 
 27 Press Release, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 
23. 
 28 Occidental Petroleum Corp., Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Republic of 
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Dissenting Opinion ¶ 1 (Oct. 5, 2012). 
 29 Alexandra Valencia, Ecuador Files Appeal to $1.77 Bln. Occidental Ruling, REUTERS (Oct. 
10, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/10/ecuador-occidental-idUSL1E8LAKEQ2012
1010 (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
 30 Mercedes Alvaro, Ecuador Plans to Audit Bilateral Investment Treaties, EUROINVESTOR (Mar. 
11, 2013), http://www.euroinvestor.com/news/2013/03/11/ecuador-plans-to-audit-bilateral-investment-
treaties/12243637 (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
 31 Occidental Petroleum Corp., Occidental Exploration and Production co. v. Republic of Ecua-
dor, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Proceeding, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=viewCase&reqFrom=Home&caseId=C80 (indicat-
ing that the annulment procedure is still pending). 
 32 News Release, Ecuador Submits a Notice Under Article 17 of the ICSID Convention, ICSID 
(July 9, 2009), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH
&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=
Announcement20. 
 33 Id.; see Award, Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11. 
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nine bilateral investment treaties, and President Correa has said that he plans 
to challenge several others.34 On March 11, 2013, President Correa presented 
a bill requesting that Ecuadorian lawmakers annul the Bilateral Investment 
Treaty.35 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 
Judicial decisions on the fair and equitable treatment standard depend on 
the circumstances of the case.36 Some examples of violations include a gov-
ernment’s willful refusal to meet contractual obligations, abuse of govern-
ment authority to evade agreements with investors, and bad faith during con-
tract performance.37 The standards of review in investment arbitration are less 
developed than in other areas of international law.38 This is due to a number 
of reasons, including the recent dramatic increase in international investment 
arbitration and the varying backgrounds of arbitrators themselves.39 
Over the past decade, the ICSID has primarily discussed fair and equita-
ble treatment as a measure for regulating a host country’s duty to an inves-
tor.40 Although the fair and equitable treatment standard is still evolving, it is 
well settled that the standard requires that the host country “act in a consistent 
manner, free from ambiguity and in total transparency, without arbitrariness 
and in accordance with the principle of good faith.”41 
The definition of the fair and equitable treatment standard evolves based 
on customary international law.42 International arbitral and judicial decisions 
have identified many themes that are applicable to fair and equitable treat-
ment: “due process, arbitrary and/or discriminatory conduct, breach of legiti-
mate expectations, acting beyond the scope of lawful authority and, to a lesser 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Alvaro, supra note 30. 
 35 Eduardo Garcia, Ecuador Seeks to End Investment Protection Treaty with U.S., REUTERS 
(Mar. 12, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/12/ecuador-us-treaty-idUKL1N0C401C20130
312 (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
 36 See Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J. WORLD 
INV. & TRADE, 357, 380 (2005). 
 37 See id. 
 38 See Valentina Vadi & Lukasz Gruszczynski, Standards of Review in International Invest-
ment Law and Arbitration: Multilevel Governance and the Commonwealth, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
613, 615 (2013). 
 39 See id. at 615, 616. 
 40 See Peter Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor’? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor 
Under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 527, 527 (2006). 
 41 Id. at 530, (citing Techmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶¶ 154–
155 (May 29, 2003)). 
 42 See Barnali Choudhury, Evolution or Devolution? Defining Fair and Equitable Treatment 
in International Investment Law, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 297, 319 (2005). 
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extent, the requirements of transparency and good faith.”43 Proportionality is 
a recent addition to these principles that decisions have recognized as under-
lying the fair and equitable treatment standard.44 In all cases, determination of 
whether a party has breached the standard depends on the specific circum-
stances of the case at issue.45 
B. The Parties’ Arguments and the Tribunal’s Findings 
OEPC’s main contention in the arbitration was that the termination of 
the Participation Contract was made without legal grounds under both the 
Participation Contract itself and Ecuadorian Law.46 OEPC first argued that 
Ecuador breached its obligations under the Bilateral Investment Treaty and 
international law by terminating the Participation Contract without legitimate 
cause.47 Second, OEPC argued that, even assuming a termination event had 
happened, the Caducidad Decree would still be in breach of the BIT and Ec-
uadorian law because it was “unfair, arbitrary, discriminatory, and dispropor-
tionate.”48 
Ecuador, on the other hand, maintained that OEPC’s conduct constituted 
valid grounds for termination under Ecuadorian law because the terms of the 
contract identified transferal of rights without authorization from the Ministry 
as grounds for termination.49 Ecuador further argued that the Ministry acted 
in an even-handed and rational manner throughout the two-year Caducidad 
investigation, fully complying with all obligations under the BIT, Ecuadorian 
law, and customary international law.50 Ecuador also filed a counterclaim 
against OEPC based on malicious prosecution, breach of the Participation 
Contract clause regarding waiver of the right to use diplomatic or consular 
channels, destructive and unlawful conduct following the Caducidad Decree, 
and failure to pay the required assignment fee.51 
The Tribunal found that the assignment of a 40 percent interest in Block 
15 to AEC was a transfer of such rights and interests as prohibited in the Par-
                                                                                                                           
 43 See id. 
 44 See Occidental Petroleum Corp., Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ec-
uador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, ¶ 404 (Oct. 5, 2012); Caroline Henckels, Proportion-
ality and the Standard of Review in Fair & Equitable Treatment Claims: Balancing Consistency & 
Stability with the Public Interest 1, 2 (SOC’Y OF INT’L ECON. LAW, Working Paper No. 2012/27, 
2012). 
 45 Schreuer, supra note 36, at 364. 
 46 Award, Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11 ¶ 201. 
 47 Id. ¶ 205. 
 48 Id. ¶ 206. 
 49 Id. ¶ 248. 
 50 Id. ¶ 249. 
 51 Id. ¶ 283. 
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ticipation Contract in the absence of Ministry authorization.52 The Tribunal 
interpreted the language prohibiting the transfer or assignment of rights and 
obligations to include partial transfers or assignments, like OEPC’s assign-
ment to AEC, because the Participation Contract does not express the prohibi-
tion as being limited to total transfers or assignments.53 In making this find-
ing, the Tribunal noted that both the Participation Contract and Ecuador’s 
Hydrocarbons Law require authorization by the Ministry for all forms of 
transfers or assignments.54 
The Tribunal also found that the OEPC failed to secure the required 
ministerial authorization and therefore breached the Participation Contract.55 
In making this finding, the Tribunal concluded that, with the assignment, 
OEPC prevented Ecuador “from exercising, in a formal way, its sovereign 
right to vet and approve AEC as the transferee of those rights and, even more 
importantly on the facts of the present case, to vet any other unknown inves-
tor to which AEC could eventually transfer its rights.”56 The Tribunal noted, 
however, that OEPC did not assign the rights to an unsuitable third party and 
Ecuador did not suffer any harm as a result of this transferal.57 Because AEC 
was already active in Ecuador in 2000 and well-known to PetroEcuador, the 
Tribunal reasoned that, if OEPC had in fact sought ministerial consent, it 
most likely would have received it.58 The Tribunal noted that OEPC’s breach 
of the Participation Contract due to its failure to secure ministerial authoriza-
tion, “while imprudent and ill advised, did not amount to bad faith.”59 
The Tribunal then held that the Caducidad Decree was not a proportion-
ate response to OEPC’s breach of contract, finding it to be “a disproportionate 
sanction and a measure tantamount to expropriation of . . . [OEPC’s] substan-
tial investment in Ecuador.”60 The Tribunal found, therefore, that the Ecuado-
rian government issued the Caducidad Decree in breach of Ecuadorian law, 
customary international law, and Article II.3(a) of the BIT.61 
The parties agreed that the constitutional principle of proportionality ap-
plies generally in Ecuadorian law.62 As evidence of customary international 
law, the Tribunal cited the growing body of jurisprudence on the principle of 
                                                                                                                           
 52 Id. ¶ 307. 
 53 Id. ¶ 305. 
 54 Id. ¶ 306. 
 55 Id. ¶ 381. 
 56 Id. ¶ 679. 
 57 Id. ¶ 447. 
 58 Id. ¶¶ 682–83. 
 59 Id. ¶ 384. 
 60 Id. ¶ 681. 
 61 Id. ¶ 452. 
 62 Id. ¶ 397. 
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proportionality, most developed in Europe, requiring that administrative 
measures not be more drastic than necessary to achieve the required end.63 
Finally, the Tribunal found that a growing number of arbitrations, in-
cluding ICSID cases, dealing with potential breaches of bilateral investment 
treaties have applied the principle of proportionality.64 Article II.3(a) of the 
Bilateral Investment Treaty provides: “[i]nvestment shall at all times be ac-
corded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security 
and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than required by international 
law.”65 
Under the Participation Contract itself, the Minister was to exercise dis-
cretion in determining whether to issue the Caducidad Decree.66 Thus, the 
Tribunal considered other alternatives available to the Minister, including 
insistence on payment of a transfer fee, improvements to the economic terms 
of the original settlement, or a negotiated settlement to address Ecuador’s 
concerns resulting from the breach.67 
This was also not the first arbitration between OEPC and Ecuador relat-
ing to the Participation Contract; in a previous arbitration, OEPC sued Ecua-
dor for reversing its practice of reimbursing value-added tax (VAT) paid on 
purchases related to their investment activities.68 In that proceeding, the Tri-
bunal found that, in making changes to its tax law without providing clarity to 
its international investor, Ecuador had altered the legal and business environ-
ment in such a way as to consist of treatment that was not fair and equitable.69 
The Tribunal found, therefore, that Ecuador declared the Caducidad De-
cree as a result of numerous factors: OEPC’s failure to obtain the Minister’s 
consent in 2000 before the assignment to AEC, the publication of a prior VAT 
award in favor of OEPC, and social unrest directed against OEPC all contrib-
uted in a significant way.70 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Id. ¶ 403. 
 64 Id. ¶ 404 (citing LG&E Energy Corp. and others v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/1 (Oct. 3, 2006); Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB 
01/12 (July 14, 2006); MTD Equity SDN.BHD. and other v. The Republic of Chile, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/7 (May 25, 2004); Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/00/2 (May 29, 2003)). 
 65 Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Ecuador, art. 2, Aug. 27, 1993, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 103-15 (1997). 
 66 Award, Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11 ¶ 424. 
 67 Id. ¶ 434. 
 68 Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 
3467, Award, ¶¶ 3–4, 26, 29 (July 1, 2004); Schreuer, supra note 36, at 378. 
 69 Award, Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co., LCIA Case No. UN 3467 ¶¶ 190–191; 
Schreuer, supra note 36, at 378. 
 70 Award, Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11 ¶¶ 683–685. 
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Considering other available remedies, the lack of harm suffered by Ec-
uador, and the intense political pressure that influenced the Minister’s deci-
sion, the Tribunal concluded that the Caducidad Decree was not a propor-
tionate response to OEPC’s breach and was in violation the fair and equitable 
treatment standard.71 
C. Calculation of Damages 
After finding that Ecuador had violated this standard of fair and equita-
ble treatment, the Tribunal awarded OEPC damages in the amount of 
$1,769,625,000.72 In determining the damages, the Tribunal calculated the 
investment’s fair market value, as mandated by Article III of the Bilateral In-
vestment Treaty, and then reduced that number by a factor of 25 percent for 
OEPC’s own breach of the Participation Contract. 73 Because the political 
backlash against OEPC after the announcement of the VAT award contributed 
to Ecuador’s declaration of the Caducidad Decree, the Tribunal found that the 
breach by OEPC would reduce its award by only 25 percent, which repre-
sented the extent to which OEPC contributed to the damages it subsequently 
suffered under the Caducidad Decree.74 
Ecuador’s Hydrocarbon Law governs investment under the Participation 
Contract and requires authorization by the Minister of Energy and Mines in 
the case of assignment.75 The Tribunal found that no valid assignment oc-
curred under Article 79 of Ecuador’s Hydrocarbon Law, so, under the law, the 
“unauthorized transfer is null and void, that means that it does not exist . . . 
[and] does not produce legal effects.”76 OEPC therefore remained the 100 
percent owner of all rights in the Participation Contract, and therefore could 
claim all of the damages awarded.77 
One Tribunal member, Professor Brigitte Stern, sharply dissented on the 
issue of damages, arguing that the 25 percent reduction of the award did not 
sufficiently account for OEPC’s own bad act.78 She noted that “with or with-
out caducidad, with or without a declaration of nullity of the assignment of 
right by the majority, they were only entitled to receive 60 percent of the ben-
efits of the Participation Contract.”79 The dissent also believed that the Tribu-
                                                                                                                           
 71 See id. ¶¶ 434, 445, 452, 684. 
 72 Id. ¶¶ 457, 825. 
 73 Id. ¶¶ 707, 824–825. 
 74 Id. ¶¶ 684, 687. 
 75 Id. ¶ 618. 
 76 Id. ¶ 636 (citing Hearing Transcript (Mar. 20, 2009) at 200, 201). 
 77 Id. ¶ 634, 651. 
 78 Occidental Petroleum Corp., Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Republic of 
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Dissenting Opinion ¶ 7 (Oct. 5, 2012). 
 79 Id. ¶ 161. 
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nal seriously underestimated the contribution by OEPC to the damage, given 
that OEPC’s behavior deliberately risked Caducidad.80 
D. Scope of Proportionality and the Standard of Review 
In the years before this case, the Tribunal had considered proportionality 
and the principles that define it.81 In 2003, the ICSID first applied the princi-
ple of proportionality in Tecmed v. Mexico.82 In Tecmed, the Tribunal consid-
ered the reasons that the host country did not renew an investor’s contract to 
operate a landfill and whether the non-renewal was proportional given the 
harm suffered by the investor.83 The Tribunal held that the host country had 
irrevocably destroyed all of the investor’s operations by failing to renew its 
permit, and “means was disproportionate to end.”84 In applying proportionali-
ty, the ICSID Tribunal sought to separate good-faith regulatory measures fo-
cused on the public interest from retaliatory or fictitious measures.85 
The ICSID’s application of the principle of proportionality, in Tecmed 
and in subsequent cases, reviews whether the regulatory investment measure 
is excessive and whether it constitutes expropriation of the opposing party’s 
investment.86 Tribunals primarily focus on the reasonableness of state con-
duct, determining whether the measure has a reasonable relationship to a ra-
tional policy.87 Although most arbitral awards are silent as to how reasona-
bleness has been interpreted, a few awards have suggested a balancing of the 
interests of the foreign investor and the host state.88 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Tribunal’s solidification of proportionality as a principle applicable 
to the fair and equitable treatment standard is a positive development insofar 
as it protects investors from arbitrary or discriminatory treatment.89 Future 
Tribunals, however, must further develop the standard to provide host coun-
tries more protection because interpretation of the principle of proportionality 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Id. ¶ 7. 
 81 See Xiuli Han, The Application of the Principle of Proportionality in Tecmed v. Mexico, 6 
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 635, 640 (2007). 
 82 See id. 
 83 See id. at 641, 642. 
 84 See id. at 642. 
 85 See id. 
 86 See Xiuli Han, On the Application of the Principle of Proportionality in ICSID Arbitration 
and Proposals to Government of the People’s Republic of China, 13 JAMES COOK U. L. REV. 233, 
243 (2006). 
 87 See Roland Kläger, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Look at the Theoretical Underpin-
nings of Legitimacy and Fairness, 11 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 435, 442 (2010). 
 88 See id. 
 89 See Henckels, supra note 44, at 1; Han, supra note 81, at 642–43. 
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thus far has tipped the balance to provide investors much greater protection 
than host countries.90 Additionally, in cases of breach of the proportionality 
principle, Tribunals will have difficulty awarding damages because they will 
need to consider how the investor’s own bad act led to the disproportionate 
response and reduce the award by that amount.91 Finally, because the Tribu-
nal’s decision has shown a preference for investors over host countries, de-
veloping countries that depend on foreign investment will be wary of ICSID 
arbitration and bilateral investment treaties.92 
Fair and equitable treatment is a misunderstood term, primarily due to 
the lack of definition ascribed to the term in several trade treaties, most nota-
bly the North American Free Trade Agreement.93 It has been argued that in-
vestors believe that fair and equitable treatment is a dynamic concept, with a 
definition that can develop and expand, while governments maintain that it is 
a fixed concept defined by its historical connotation.94 Because the balance of 
protection has shifted to favor the investor with the expansion of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard to include the proportionality principle, govern-
ments should espouse the concept of an expanding fair and equitable treat-
ment standard and push for heightened protection for states in the future.95 
This award illustrates the ICSID Tribunal’s willingness to review admin-
istrative decisions of a sovereign under the principle of proportionality within 
the fair and equitable treatment standard.96 As such, the Tribunal has demon-
strated its commitment to using proportionality as the newest principle in the 
evolving definition of fair and equitable treatment.97 Over the past decade, 
investment arbitration has faced considerable criticism, most notably the 
premise that investment arbitration does not in fact provide a level playing 
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field, but is instead partial to protecting foreign investors.98 Because propor-
tionality analysis balances the investor’s interests with competing public in-
terests, the Tribunal should interpret the proportionality principle in the future 
to provide greater protection to host countries as well, which will result in a 
more level playing field.99 
The fair and equitable treatment standard requires an investor to deliver 
the reasonably anticipated benefits of the investment, and requires the host 
country to allow the investor a reasonable opportunity to profit on the invest-
ment.100 The ICSID Tribunal must focus on the “bargain” between the inves-
tor and host country and decide whether both sides are keeping to this bar-
gain.101 In order to better protect host countries, the Tribunal will need to de-
termine whether the investor is working diligently enough to ensure the antic-
ipated benefit.102 
On the issue of damages, this case highlights the complexity in deter-
mining damages when the award is based on proportionality.103 As the dis-
senting arbitrator urged, there is difficulty in identifying contributory fault in 
practice and determining how much an investor contributed to the dispropor-
tionate response.104 Some have argued that the subjective nature of the calcu-
lation, which “defies any mathematical precision,” caused the great diver-
gence in this case between the majority and the dissent.105 Although a more 
detailed analysis of the reasoning behind the award might help, determination 
of allocation of fault is itself so subjective that it is hard to see what analysis 
the Tribunal could have offered to support the percentage of fault it allocated 
for each party.106 The calculation of damages, especially on the issue of con-
tributory fault by a breaching investor, will continue to be controversial, in 
this case and in the future.107 Host countries will be reluctant to take action 
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against breaching investors, given the potential for immense liability if the 
ICSID later rules the measure disproportionate to the breach.108 In this way, 
the size of the award itself provides greater protection to investors.109 
Arbitrations between investors and host countries require balancing the 
private and public law concerns and “must avoid one-sided preferential 
treatment of investor rights.”110 There is a strong need for a proper balance 
between the protection of investors and the right of a state to regulate conduct 
within its borders.111 It remains to be seen how the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard will continue to develop in the future and what new element 
will be included in the standard.112 
This expansion of the standard of fair and equitable treatment protects 
investors; however it must also continue to evolve to provide host countries 
adequate protections from investor conduct. 113 Greater protection for host 
countries is absolutely necessary to maintain the legitimacy of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard and the voluntary submission of cases to the IC-
SID Tribunal.114 Otherwise, the preference for investors, coupled with the 
possibility of great liability under the ICSID arbitrations, may discourage 
states not only from enacting legitimate regulations, but also from engaging 
in bilateral investment treaties and ICSID arbitration.115 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of encouraging private investment in developing countries has 
led to an increasing number of bilateral investment treaties. The fair and equi-
table treatment standard is a basic premise of these bilateral investment trea-
ties, and it has expanded over these years to encompass many principles, in-
cluding most recently proportionality. Most of the principles under the stand-
ard heighten investor protection. This heightened investor protection, howev-
er, has led to increasing dissatisfaction among host countries. In addition, dif-
ficulty of determining the amount of damages in these cases will continue to 
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cause conflict. The Tribunal must provide more protections to host countries, 
which can be achieved through further interpretation of the principle of pro-
portionality and through further scrutiny of the investor’s economic benefit. If 
the Tribunal fails to provide more protection to host countries and to find a 
more systematic way of awarding damages, it will see increasing withdrawal 
of host countries from bilateral investment treaties and from the ICSID itself. 
